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Introduction 
 
The third case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada, the second within a ten-
day period, has drawn renewed concern and public attention to Canada’s beef industry, and to 
what is being done to control the spread of BSE.  This has intensified because the latest case is in 
a cow born after the 1997 ban of meat and bone meal (MBM) in cattle feed rations.  Also with 
this latest case, the public discussion around the issues appears to have taken a more desperate 
tone, with suggestions of a mass cull of cows




This suggests that some perspective is needed in interpreting recent events, understanding the 
logic of control measures that have been put in place and those that are being considered, and in 
developing future expectations.  Concerns around BSE relate to the potential for spread of the 
disease to its variant in humans, and to the spread of BSE in the cattle population.  The purpose 
of this special report is to clarify current discussions by outlining the basic science of BSE and 
its logical implications. 
 
Science of BSE
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BSE was first diagnosed in the United Kingdom in 1986, largely in dairy cattle.  It is now known 
that the disease emerged but was undetected for some time prior to that - the first real cases of 
BSE in the UK probably occurred in the late 1970s.  There are alternative theories as to the 
origins of BSE; however, the most widely accepted is that BSE is a variant of a sheep nervous 
system ailment known as scrapie, and that the infectious agent that spreads BSE is a prion- an 
infectious form of protein.  It is believed that BSE spread in the UK cattle population through 
prion-contaminated MBM fed in cattle rations.  BSE is not readily transmitted to other species; 
hogs are only infected with BSE by repeated injection with contaminated material, and tests 
suggest that poultry cannot be infected.   
 
The prion has only been found in the nervous system and very specific lymphoid tissues in cattle.  
It has been determined that the brain, spinal cord, ileum, eyes, tonsils, distal ileum and root 
ganglia are the tissues that can be infective.  It is believed that trace amounts of infective tissue 
can cause BSE infection within cattle.  The prion does not appear to be destroyed by heat and 
pressure in the rendering process, nor through treatment by enzymes. A practical means of safely 
destroying prions has yet to be devised. 
 
Regulatory Responses to BSE 
 
In response to the BSE situation in the UK, Canada, like most other developed countries, banned 
the use of MBM in ruminant feed rations and human food consumption in 1997.  Following the 
                                                 
1 Edmonton Journal, January 13, 2005 
2 For example, Secret tests reveal cattle feed contaminated by animal parts: Mad cow fears spark review of 'vegetable-only' 
livestock feeds by Chad Skelton, Vancouver Sun December 16
th, 2004 
3 This section draws from Chris Clark and John Campbell, “Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy”, Large Animal Veterinary 
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first Canadian BSE case in May, 2003, Canada went further and designated specific cattle tissues 
as “Specified Risk Materials” (SRMs)
4, and began separating these materials in meat packing 
plants.  In late 2004, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) introduced proposed 
regulations regarding the use of MBM.  These include: 
 
•  Removal and separation of SRM materials in beef slaughter plants; 
•  Separate and dedicated transportation and rendering facilities for SRM’s and for the other 
inedible beef byproducts; and 
•  Destruction of rendered SRMs. 
 
Additional regulatory measures that are in place, or have been proposed, represent redundancies 
to the above actions to eradicate BSE.  Thus, the Canadian regulatory response actually goes 
further in providing failsafe measures than the best science would require.  
 
The Implications of the Science and Regulatory Response 
 
The best scientific knowledge relating to BSE posits that the prion is responsible for the spread 
of the disease.  It also finds that the prion can only exist in the SRMs as defined above. Thus, the 
logic follows that if the SRMs are removed, the risks associated with BSE are also removed.  
The implications of this are profound: 
 
•  The removal and destruction of SRMs is a sufficient condition for the safety of beef as it 
relates to the spread of BSE in cattle and the related disease in humans, Creutzfeld-Jacob 
Disease (CJD) or variant-Creutzfeld-Jacob Disease (vCJD); 
 
•  Humans cannot contract vCJD from eating BSE infected beef if the SRMs are entirely 
removed and destroyed.  The converse implication is that the victims of vCJD in the UK, if 
indeed beef was the source of vCJD, must have eaten foods made from SRM materials.  
Prions do not infect cattle tissues other than SRMs;  
 
•  Because rendering does not destroy the prion, MBM made from infected cattle byproducts 
could contaminate other cattle if SRMs were not removed.  However, with SRMs removed, 
the ban on feeding MBM back to ruminants is actually a redundancy; any possibility of 
infection is removed with the removal of SRMs; and 
 
•  Additional observed cases of BSE in the future do not translate into greater food safety risks 
or more risk of BSE spreading in Canada if SRMs are removed and destroyed. 
 
 
Prior to the 1997 MBM feed ban, some transmission could have occurred due to feeding 
ruminant MBM back to ruminants.  Following the ban on feeding MBM to ruminants, this risk of 
                                                 
4 SRMs include skull, brain, trigeminal ganglia, eyes, tonsils, spinal cord, and dorsal root ganglia of cattle over 30 months of age, 
and the distal ileum of all cattle. 
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transmission must have diminished dramatically.  However, with the removal of SRMs from the 
food and feed system, the science implies that the risk of spread is not just further reduced; it is 
eliminated. Even if older cows born prior to the banning of MBM in cattle feed were at greater 
risk of being exposed to BSE, removing and destroying the SRMs from these cattle when they 
are slaughtered eliminates all risk of BSE spread. Therefore, a cull of cows born prior to the 
1997 feed ban would not provide any benefit with regard to either food safety or decreased 




Regulatory responses in Canada, as well as those in other countries, rely on the consistent 
application of scientific knowledge to the control of livestock diseases.  That is why it is 
important that the logic behind BSE control measures and their implications are understood.  It is 
also important because scientific knowledge is likely to evolve.  For example, a recent Swiss 
study of mice treated with scrapie found that prions could move from the nervous system tissue 
into other tissues as part of an autoimmune response to a secondary infection from another 
illness or as a result of trauma
5.  Because it is in a different species, it is unclear what (if any) 
implications it has for BSE.  It must also be noted that, in any case, sick or injured (“downer”) 
livestock delivered to packing plants are now excluded from the food system and routed for 
destruction with SRMs.   
 
As identified above, some of the regulatory measures currently in place or proposed go well 
beyond what the best science implies is necessary.  These redundancies are failsafe measures.  
One way to interpret them is that they serve as a form of hedge against future changes in the 
scientific understanding of BSE in ways not anticipated by current knowledge. 
    
In addition, we cannot rule out that the best science, for whatever reason and however remote the 
possibility may simply be wrong regarding BSE.  Adherence to science as the reference in policy 
decisions is, after all, a social choice (although the alternative of not adhering to science is 
unclear). 
 
However, there are serious conversations regarding BSE safety and control measures that purport 
to use scientific arguments to reach conclusions that serious risks relating to the spread of BSE 
and food safety could exist under Canadian control measures
6.  The scientific discussions 
outlined in this report suggests that removing and destroying prions is sufficient to halt the 
spread of BSE and the risk to human health. Assertions contrary to this must either not be based 
on science, or are simply wrong.           
                                                 
5 Heikenwalder, M. et al. Science Published online: doi:10.1126/science.1106460 (2005). 
6 For example, see Claims and Assumptions Underpinning the Final USDA Minimal  
BSE Risk Rule:  Are They Valid? Published on the R-CALF website January 28
th, 2005.  Among the claims made is that chickens 
fed MBM that in turn are used in manufacturing chicken meal which is fed to cattle is a source of BSE spread.  But by removing 
SRMs prior to MBM manufacture the above scenario in fact represents no risk whatsoever in spreading BSE; rather it represents 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the above logic relating to removal of SRMs.  
 